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The principal preoccupation 
of the American peace move-
ment in the 1920's was the 
re-definition of the nation's 
role in European affairs. Hor-
rified by the destructiveness of 
the World War, American 
peace groups were determined 
to prevent the recurrence of 
violence among the advanced 
industrial powers who an-
chored the European state 
system. Force as an instru-
ment of policy among the 
powers was demonstrably ca-
tastrophic. At the same time, 
American peace elements felt 
certain that the realization of 
their hope depended upon 
the moral and physical 
strength of the United States. 
Consciously "America-cen-
tric/ ' post-war peace activists 
assumed that questions of war 
and peace in modern indus-
trial civilization turned upon 
the decisions of the American 
people. It was for this reason that they debated vigorously the compara-
tive value to American policy and world peace of the League of Na-
î t is perhaps true that the path to inter-
nationalism through small states is dangerous 
and uncertain; but, paradoxical as it may 
seem, internationalism can rest only on 
satisfied nationalism. The sentiment is in-
tractable and compelling, and cannot be re-
moved from politics unless it is recognized; 
peoples whose aspirations have long been 
thwarted will not be satisfied with anything 
short of self-determination. . . . Interna-
tional law depends for its validity upon the 
agreement of sovereign states, and it will 
continue to be weak in proportion to the 
number of states whose agreement is neces-
sary. 
We are forced, therefore, to accept the 
anomaly of an increase in the number of 
nation states, at the same time that we are 
attempting, by an international league, to lay 
a stable basis for the federation of the world. 
Lindsay Rogers, "The League of 
Nations and the National State," 
in Stephen P. Duggan (éd.), The 
League of Nations: The Principle 
and the Practice (Boston, 1919), 
86-87. 
69 
tions, the World Court, arbitration treaties, collective sanctions and the 
outlawry of war. Yet even these issues, in the end, were no more than 
variants of one elemental question: how could the United States most 
satisfactorily introduce discipline in European politics? 
Three alternative strategies arose in the post-war peace movement 
in response to that question. Although they are categorized here as 
legalist, reformist and functionalist, the strategies were by no means 
mutually exclusive. Proponents of one often collaborated with ad-
vocates of another. Moreover, none of the strategies was ever developed 
with deliberateness or articulated with precision. The premium in the 
post-war movement was upon action and not contemplation. Never-
theless, alternative strategies were recognizable. Each was distinguished 
by a unique understanding of the nature of peace. And each was ani-
mated by the mixed ideological commitments that men bring into 
movements. 
The legalist tradition was more than an ideology or a movement. It 
was an ethos that suffused the thinking of a significant number of post-
war peace leaders.1 Organized in associations like the American Peace 
Society, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the 
American Society of International Law, supporters of a legalist ap-
proach to world politics perceived peace as a state attendant upon the 
triumph of justice. Legalist spokesmen like Arthur Deerin Call, execu-
tive secretary of the American Peace Society, and Dr. James Brown 
Scott, an authority on international law and an officer of the Carnegie 
Endowment, held that the achievement of peace was contingent upon 
the extension of justice throughout international politics. The ex-
tension of justice, in turn, consisted of the codification by experts of 
international rules of equity, the application of these rules by an inter-
national court of justice, and final acceptance by litigants respectful of 
the sanction of world public opinion. Through a tightening web of 
procedure, substantive 'legal justice" would gradually be gained and 
peace assured. Legalists made it clear that they did not seek the "abstract 
justice" of "the reformer and the idealist," but the "legal justice" of 
courts and codes that could be "counted upon to function with certainty" 
in minimizing the possibilities of future war.2 Frightened by the anti-
national, class appeal of Lenin's "Mundanism," they were determined 
to solidify the modern state system and existing property relationships by 
purging the Old Order of its failings through the instruments of en-
lightened judicial leadership. Peace was reached through the slow, 
deliberate procedures of the courts and "by making the law itself its 
own best argument for obedience."3 It was a trying, trial process and 
decidedly not one for the impatient. People must not measure "the 
progress of nations by the foot-rule of our short lives," warned the 
venerable Elihu Root. "You must think in terms of generations and 
centuries."4 
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Legalism essentially represented the views of a conservative elite who 
wielded the scepter of law against the twin dangers of international 
violence and social convulsion. Fearful of the alarming unpredictability 
of Old World politics, legalists opposed American involvement in 
European affairs and supported the preservation of complete freedom 
of action throughout the world. Any revision of America's traditional 
posture of "interested isolation" in world affairs was "unnecessary and 
unlikely."5 Legalists reasoned that the Monroe Doctrine had irrevocably 
divided Europe and America into separate spheres. Its century-long 
success had permitted the United States to gravitate toward a polity of 
law while the European system had stagnated in conflict and violence.6 
In conjunction with this belief, legalists feared that embroilment in 
European politics would sharpen tensions among ethnic groups and un-
settle social stability within the United States. David Jayne Hill stated 
solemnly that American intervention in Old World affairs "would re-
sult in divisions that would be deeper than they are now and involve 
our Government in constant domestic turmoil; for it is not realized in 
Europe that we have in the United States all the races, all the race 
affections, and all the race prejudices that exist in Europe."7 Among 
legalists everywhere, there was little doubt that the risks implicit in 
active American participation in European politics outweighed any 
possible gain. 
While the United States must avoid entanglement in Old World 
politics, it could nevertheless contribute to Europe's pacification by 
universalizing the principles of the American judicial system. Legalists 
commonly contended that the foundation of the American constitutional 
system lay in the power of the Supreme Court to adjudicate vital differ-
ences among sovereign states. Indeed it was in the practical validation 
of the principle "that when any one of the states becomes recalcitrant, it 
shall be coerced by law" that America had made its "supreme contribu-
tion to world peace."8 Without physical force, the Supreme Court success-
fully applied the rule of law among rival states. It was the paragon of 
judicial order, the basis for a world founded on law and justice. The 
hope of peace among civilized states rode upon the internationalization 
of its principles and the elevation of the whole Anglo-American legal 
experience to world practice.9 
Thus the purpose of legalist peace action was to urge the structuring 
of European politics along juridical lines inspired by the American ex-
perience. Legalist leaders supported efforts to collaborate in the codifica-
tion of international law and favored American accession to the World 
Court. They also expressed great interest in bringing about the convoca-
tion of a Third Hague Conference. Legalists at no time, however, per-
mitted policy preferences to lead them into support of mass action cam-
paigns. Rather than organize popular support, they preferred to sponsor 
legal research and cooperate closely with government officials. "After 
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all," Arthur Deerin Call told the directors of the American Peace Society, 
"the greatest peace society with which we are permitted officially to as-
sociate is the United States Government."10 As Washington progressed 
in its pursuit of liberty under law, the blessings of order, peace and 
prosperity would spread to embrace all peoples. 
While legalists identified peace with triumphant justice, other peace 
groups saw their goal as the simple absence of war. The social reformers 
who headed pacifist, church and women's organizations understood 
peace as the condition that followed upon the destruction of the war 
system. "Peace means getting rid of war," the Reverend John Haynes 
Holmes said firmly, "and getting rid of war means outlawing it along 
with piracy, the duel, and the saloon."11 The reformist strategy was 
distinguished by the assumption that war was a crime, a collective sin, a 
hideous institution that blocked man's access to the humane, Christian 
life. "Each age faces one supreme moral issue," said Sherwood Eddy, a 
leading preacher of the Social Gospel. "For our time that issue is war. 
It is Caesar or Christ, man's way or God's, the appeal to force as ultimate 
power or to organized goodwill, war or peace."12 Frustrated by the 
failure of a war to end war, reformist leaders intended to subject the 
monster to the grinding power of American social reform. 
Reformists throughout the decade invested great faith in the progres-
sive importance of law. Fresh from the hard-won victories of prohibition 
and women's suffrage, they shared the legalist confidence in the superi-
ority of American constitutionalism. Unlike the legalists, however, re-
formists identified the strength of American law not in its sanction for 
order as much as in its capacity to liberate men's minds from prejudice 
and to abolish pernicious social institutions. "Making war illegal seems 
a long way off," the pacifist Sidney Strong told Senator William E. Borah. 
"So once did slavery and the saloon seem eternal, but I've seen them 
pass."13 A press release from the Women's Peace Union of the Western 
Hemisphere expressed the same sense of reform progression, along with 
the sexual consciousness that actuated feminist peace leaders in the 1920's: 
"Women won suffrage. Women won prohibition. Now women are 
putting through the outlawry of war."14 
Reformists agreed that the United States possessed the spiritual energy 
and material resources needed to suppress the institution of war. But 
they differed in their analyses of Europe's problems and in their plans 
for adapting America's strength to European needs. Most reformists 
identified Europe's post-war malaise as a spiritual exhaustion that had 
been compounded by social and economic dislocation. They therefore 
exhorted the American people to transfuse part of the country's abundant 
spiritual vitality to the Old World through lines of trade and law. Dis-
claiming any interest in the politics of foreign policymaking, the great 
majority of reformists worked to rouse popular sentiment behind a 
variety of non-entangling actions that would re-inflate Europe's con-
fidence and "stabilize the world."15 
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In practice, the reformist strategy operated through several educa-
tional and organizational enterprises. In 1921 the Federal Council of 
Churches of Christ in America announced plans to lead its twenty million 
constituents upon a Ten-Year Crusade for a Warless World. Through 
its Commission on International Justice and Goodwill, the Federal 
Council proposed to shift modern international relations from a "war-
system" to a "peace-system" by generating enlightened public opinion 
and by exalting juridical substitutes for war. The Church Peace Union 
was equally interested in changing the "state of mind that now condones 
war"; and it actively assisted the World Alliance for International 
Friendship Through the Churches in sharpening antiwar sentiment 
among Protestant clergymen.16 Among secular organizations the National 
Council for Prevention of War took the lead in trying to activate busi-
ness, labor and farm groups in a united front against war. The National 
Committee on the Cause and Cure of War assembled nine national 
women's organizations into a lobby for study and action, while pacifists 
gathered in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom 
and the Women's Peace Union.17 G. Sherwood Eddy and Kirby Page 
spread the doctrine of Christian pacifism and international cooperation 
across college campuses through the agency of the YMCA. The Fellow-
ship of Reconciliation and the War Resisters League sustained those who 
chose to renounce forever individual participation in the war system. 
In meeting after meeting, pacifists, churchmen and women's groups re-
solved their commitment to Christian understanding, the World Court, 
disarmament, the outlawry of war and even (upon rigid conditions) the 
League of Nations.18 Propagandizing and organizing, they hoped to calm 
Europe by creating in America a wave of moral unanimity that would 
smash the war system and uncover the foundations of lasting peace. 
Several reformists dissented, however, from the majority position. 
Led by Bull Moose veterans like Raymond Robins, an influential re-
formist minority blamed Europe's discontent upon reactionary leader-
ship and volatile class divisions. Minority spokesmen were deeply con-
cerned with America's vulnerability to continued European wars. But 
they resented efforts to excite Americans into concern with Europe on 
the grounds that the prosecution of an active foreign policy would result 
in the nation's absorption in the corrupt politics of the Old Diplomacy. 
The philosopher John Dewey captured the progressive dilemma in these 
terms: 
. . . while our day of isolation is over, international affairs 
are still conducted upon a basis and by methods that were 
instituted before democracy was heard of as a political fact. 
Hence we engage in foreign policies only at the risk of harm-
ing even such imperfect internal democracy as we have 
already achieved.19 
Distrustful of Europe and fearful of new wars, reformists like Dewey 
demanded that the American government lead an attack upon the legal 
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underpinnings of the war system. Dissident progressives pressed in-
sistently for the outlawry of the lawful institution of war and for the 
establishment of an international Supreme Court to settle disputes. By 
purging war from the body of international law, outlawry enthusiasts 
intended to expose war in its criminal infamy, smash the Old Diplomacy 
and render American-made law the prescriptive pattern of international 
behavior. It was a large, perhaps laughable order. But it appeared to 
many post-war progressives as the most effective way of purifying Euro-
pean politics and making the world safe for America.20 
Despite the minority fears, the larger reformist strategy never en-
visioned an active American role in European politics. When they spoke 
of international organization and substitutes for war, reformists thought 
of juridical devices and developing bonds of moral sentiment. They 
expected the United States to assume an exhortatory, pontifical role in 
Europe that would bring Europe moral uplift and political tranquillity. 
But they regarded the total displacement of the war system as an arduous 
process that the American people could best promote by retaining their 
youth, enthusiasm and independence. As the slogan of the National 
Council for the Prevention of War put it, " 'America First'—In the Cru-
sade for a Warless World."21 
Finally, leaders of organizations like the League of Nations Non-
Partisan Association, the Foreign Policy Association and the World 
Peace Foundation favored a functional approach to world politics. Con-
ceiving of peace as an ongoing process, functionalists maintained that the 
very fragility of modern industrial civilization demanded the institution-
alization of managerial controls over international affairs. Columbia 
University history professor James T. Shotwell believed, for example, 
that "peace does not mean merely the abstention from war, it means as 
well the maintenance of those conditions under which civilization can 
endure and develop."22 Peace was a problem of management. It was 
a problem of rationalizing techniques which would refine European 
politics by excluding irresponsible violence. 
The drive to rationalize the processes of European politics grew with 
the realization that science and technology had multiplied the scope and 
destructiveness of modern war by unanticipated proportions. Each new 
invention, each scientific advance moved industrial civilization further 
from human control and toward a terrifying momentum of its own. Ray-
mond B. Fosdick, a former assistant secretary of war and a leading ex-
ponent of the League of Nations, felt that "the whole world is tottering 
on the edge of an abyss. Modern science has put us in a position where 
with another outburst of passion, . . . we can destroy all the values that 
have been painfully built up in the last thousand years. The race never 
had such weapons before, and our situation is entirely new in history."23 
Shotwell and Fosdick agreed. Without organization, without systematic 
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direction by "creative scientific intelligence," runaway technology would 
"bury this thing we call civilization in a grave too deep for resurrection/'24 
Spreading along lines of industrial interdependence, modern total war 
promised to trap the United States and all others in its fury. Function-
alists looked back upon Wilson's futile attempt at war-time neutrality as 
ample proof of the precariousness of the American position. They 
furthermore anticipated that the growing importance and complexity of 
international commerce would only heighten the nation's vulnerability. 
Certain that America could not escape the epidemic violence of modern 
war, functionalists demanded that Republican policymakers cease the 
evasion of unilateralism and confront directly the unavoidable question: 
how could the United States order international relations in a way that 
would dampen national rivalries before they inflamed the lines of inter-
dependence and sucked America into conflict? The nation seemed to 
possess little real choice. Certainly James G. McDonald, chairman of 
the Foreign Policy Association, thought that the matter was clear: "We 
may not like European entanglements, and I don't like them myself, but 
when forces are in operation which will inevitably create entanglements 
and difficulties, I prefer assuming responsibility for positive effort to 
avoid them rather than to assume responsibility for inaction."25 For its 
independence as well as its safety, America must take the lead in ration-
alizing and maintaining a "définitized" world order.26 
Functionalists placed their highest hopes for the creation of a "de-
finitized" world order in the League of Nations and its associated 
agencies. For one thing, the League promised to absorb the gnawing 
insecurity and overcome the disorganization that together were at the 
bottom of Europe's discontent. By systematizing international diplo-
macy through continuing conferences and committees, the League ap-
paratus would create techniques that enveloped the threat of violence 
in folds of investigations and reports. The League appeared as "an essen-
tially European organization" that substituted conference, arbitration 
and "the ordinary processes of civilized governments" for the uncon-
trollable des true tiveness of war.27 In this same vein, the League repre-
sented a unique laboratory for experimentation in human and institu-
tional cooperation. It was potentially the most attractive proving ground 
for the work of social engineers. And social engineers, functionalists 
maintained, were truly those figures who commanded the levers of 
future world progress. "The sword won't do the job any more," exclaimed 
the historian Charles A. Beard. 
The social engineer is the fellow. The old talk about 
sovereignty, rights of man, dictatorship of the proletariat, 
triumphant democracy and the like is pure bunk. It will 
not run trains or weave cloth or hold society together.28 
At the same time, functionalists believed that the League served 
splendidly to amplify America's voice in European affairs. The United 
75 
States had no interest in strictly European affairs, they agreed, for 
America was more than a European power. But America did have an 
interest in avoiding involvement in unnecessary wars and in maintaining 
a prosperous international trading community. The nature of the 
nation's interests thus required that it assume an active advisory role in 
matters of international importance. Arthur M. Sweetser, a former 
Boston newsman and a prominent official in the League Secretariat, ably 
expressed the functionalist position as early as 1920. America, he de-
clared, was "the greatest cohesive political unity in existence, the richest 
nation in the world, the most highly organized," and the one whose 
"ideals and principles" flourished best by "showing them to the whole 
world and urging other nations to follow them." This did not mean, how-
ever, that America must concern itself with the petty disputes of others. 
"I mean quite on the contrary," said Sweetser, "that she should be ever 
ready, in a strategic position, where, when an issue arises which is worthy 
of her participation, she should be able to express herself and express 
herself fruitfully. I cannot believe that any American wishes this 
country to be mute in the world's great struggle of ideas."29 The League 
obviously provided the most suitable forum for America's purposes. 
Although a European combine, it offered a boardroom in which the 
United States could successfully discharge its consultative responsibility 
in the management of peace. 
The functionalist campaign to streamline international relations by 
affirming America's advisory leadership took place along many fronts. 
The World Peace Foundation and the Foreign Policy Association spon-
sored programs to gather and disseminate facts which emphasized the 
intricate interdependence of modern international relations. The League 
of Nations Non-Partisan Association propagandized directly for public 
support of American entrance into the League. It subsidized speakers, 
published and distributed literature and formed local cells across the 
United States. In addition, pro-League leaders tried to affect national 
policy by staffing governmental committees of inquiry on international 
affairs and by influencing friendly Administration officials. Functionalists 
also worked to establish a network of cooperation among European peace 
leaders who shared their belief in the need for the rapid rationalization 
of international politics. The Division of Economics and History of the 
Carnegie Endowment supervised the formation in Europe of several 
national committees of scholars and industrial experts, who were charged 
with providing their respective governments with technical data on 
matters of disarmament and security. The Institute of International 
Education acted as a service center for the exchange among countries of 
scholars and students. And the International Committee on Intellectual 
Co-operation, first formed in 1926, facilitated the interchange of informa-
tion and research through a single agency at Geneva. At every turn, 
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functionalists strove doggedly to extend and toughen links of daily de-
pendency throughout the modern state system. 
In the end, the most striking feature of the functionalist strategy-
like the legalist and reformist alternatives—was an essential modesty. Not 
one intended to change the independent basis of the American world role. 
Not one challenged the structure of decision-making within the United 
States.30 On the contrary, each aimed only to modify Washington's 
definition of the American role in a way that would discipline European 
politics without jeopardizing American independence. The modesty of 
this ambition was the product of many factors. Intellectual uncertainty, 
calculations of political expediency and the hope of uniting a hodgepodge 
of contentious peace groups all acted to restrain the movement's ambi-
tions and kept it from acting upon its highest expressions of principle. 
Yet perhaps the most powerful source of the movement's modesty was its 
abiding sense of nationalism. Nearly every peace activist believed that 
the American national experiment contained patterns of right conduct 
that were relevant to Europe's needs. Whether legal, spiritual or func-
tional, the behavioral patterns at the base of the American experience 
seemed well designed to overcome the dangerous incalculability of Old 
World politics. 
At bottom, the movement's confidence in the relevance of the Ameri-
can national experience was only part of its larger hope of founding 
world peace upon "a newer and higher conception of nationalism."31 
Most peace workers in the Twenties rejected the "sentimental inter-
nationalism" of the pre-war movement and disliked the exclusiveness 
that was inherent in Wilson's vision of national self-determination. In-
stead, they endeavored to create an international polity that fitted the 
peculiar needs of their unsettled times. Specifically, post-war peace lead-
ers sought to institute a world order that would accommodate cultural 
and political diversity at the same time as it ended the raw national 
egoism and conflicting Great Power imperialisms that had historically 
produced war. Seeking a positive alternative to rank egoism and Great 
Power tyranny, antiwar activists struggled to build a visible Higher 
Nationalism from the collective experiences of those modern peoples 
who recognized war as their common enemy. The need of civilized man, 
wrote Kirby Page, was "to carry one step higher a process which has long 
been operating." In plain terms, the issue was "whether or not militant 
nationalism, greedy imperialism and international anarchy are to lead 
nations on to further wars, or whether an era of international peace and 
justice shall be ushered in by outlawing war as a crime and by creating 
effective social machinery through which a new conception of nation-
alism may find expression."32 
With little doubt, nationalist sentiment was pervasive within Ameri-
can society in the 1920's. But it was not strictly a tribal affair. In the 
thinking of American peace leaders, nationalism expressed the reality of 
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human diversity and the tenacity of human allegiance. Fascinated with 
its promise, they strove to channel its dynamism behind the functional 
and juridical alternatives to war that had long been vindicated by the 
American experience. Their hope for a Higher Nationalism was 
certainly grand. But it was not naive. Based upon a common interest 
and expanding through common institutions and common loyalties, it 
seemed in the Twenties to be the most humanly realistic solution to the 
calamity of modern total war.33 
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